In the matter of an arbitration under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

PCA Case No. 2015-28

Permanent Court of Arbitration Peace Palace The Hague The Netherlands

Day 2

Thursday, 31st March 2016

Hearing on Request for Provisional Measures

Before:

H.E. JUDGE VLADIMIR GOLITSYN (President)
H.E. JUDGE JIN-HYUN PAIK
H.E. JUDGE PATRICK ROBINSON
PROFESSOR FRANCESCO FRANCIONI
H.E. JUDGE PATIBANDLA CHANDRASEKHARA RAO

BETWEEN:

THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC (APPLICANT)

-and-

THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA (RESPONDENT)

-concerning-

THE "ENRICA LEXIE" INCIDENT

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- 3 (10.00 am)
- 4 THE PRESIDENT: Good morning. The Arbitral Tribunal will
- 5 continue its hearing on the provisional measures, in
- the case concerning the "Enrica Lexie" incident. We
- 7 will now hear the second round of Italy's oral
- 8 arguments. I give the floor to Sir Daniel Bethlehem
- 9 to begin his statement.

10 ITALY'S SECOND ROUND OF ORAL ARGUMENT

11 SPEECH BY SIR DANIEL BETHLEHEM

- 12 SIR DANIEL BETHLEHEM: Mr President, members of the
- 13 Tribunal, Italy's reply submission will be brief.
- I will be on my feet for about 15 minutes. In the
- 15 course of my remarks, I will respond to three of the
- questions put by the Tribunal last night. I will be
- followed by Sir Michael Wood. He will also speak for
- about 15 minutes and will respond to the remaining
- 19 question of the Tribunal. Ambassador Azzarello, the
- Italian Agent, will conclude Italy's presentation with
- a formal reading of Italy's submissions.
- Mr President, members of the Tribunal, at the
- start of his presentation yesterday afternoon,
- 24 Professor Pellet said as follows:
- 25 "I will not attempt to answer Italy's presentation

of this morning, although it happens that we had in many respects anticipated their arguments."

Counsel for India failed to engage at all with virtually anything that we said yesterday morning, notwithstanding their anticipation of what we would say. We accept, of course, that there were only two hours between the end of our submissions and the start of theirs, but in their anticipation, counsel for India might have had in mind such issues as the MOX Plant case, and analysis of the ITLOS Order, which included the text of paragraph 132, and other key issues. We imagine that our frustration will have been shared by the Tribunal, as we were treated largely to an oral recitation of India's Written Observations. We heard nothing that we had not already addressed in our opening presentation.

Mr President, members of the Tribunal, we did not want to come here this morning and simply repeat what we said yesterday morning. In reality, this hearing has become a single round of pleadings. We opened our submissions yesterday; India will reply to them this afternoon. There will be no meaningful opportunity for Italy to engage with India's substantive arguments.

This said, our brief submissions this morning will

¹ Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 134, lines 18 – 21

endeavour to draw together some key threads of Italy's argument.

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Mr President, members of the Tribunal, as we reflect on it, your decision on Italy's request comes down to one essential question. Everything else is context and reasoning. The question at the heart of these proceedings is the following: does the Tribunal consider Italy's undertaking to return Sergeant Girone to India, if this is required by a decision of the Tribunal, to be reliable in fact and in law? the provisional measure that Italy has requested is both appropriate and necessary. Quite apart from the shortcomings of law in India's submissions on pre-judgment and prejudice, which Sir Michael will address shortly, India's arguments to this effect only arise if you accept India's submission that Italy's undertaking to return cannot be trusted. If it can and should be trusted, no question of pre-judgment even arises, because there would be no question of pre-judgment as a matter of fact. If this is required by a decision of the Tribunal, Sergeant Girone would be returned to India to stand trial. India's rights would have been comprehensively protected.

You heard yesterday from Professor Verdirame on the jurisprudence addressing the presumption of compliance. He also underlined the point that even in

the difficult politically charged circumstances of this case, Italy has honoured its undertaking to return the Marines in the past.

The reality is that the Marines did return to India within the deadline stipulated. Indeed, this is explicitly recorded in the Indian Supreme Court Order of 2nd April 2013 that India submitted as an annex to its Written Observations before ITLOS and which we have now included at tab 16 of your folders². I don't take you to that Order now, but I draw it to your attention.

In response to the first question put by the Tribunal last night, I cannot speak for Mr Bundy on the question of what he had in mind when he spoke about "intense diplomatic efforts". What we can say is that there were at that point, as there have been on other occasions, diplomatic exchanges between the two States in an attempt to resolve the impasse of this dispute. There were certainly diplomatic exchanges at that time, and the Marines were returned to India within the deadline that was required by Italy's undertaking.

Mr President, members of the Tribunal, there are four points that follow from this. The first point is

² Verbatim Record, ITLOS/PV.15/C24/1 (uncorrected), p. 13, lines 33-44 (Bethlehem) (Annex IT-34 (a)); India's ITLOS Written Statement, Annex 20, at para. 2

that Italy has in fact always honoured its
undertakings to India to return the Marines, and
indeed more generally in respect of this dispute³, and
there is no reason whatever to consider that Italy
would not do so again in the face of an undertaking
given before this Tribunal.

The second point is that this undertaking comes on top of the obligation on Italy, and indeed on India, under Article 11 of Annex VII of UNCLOS to comply with the award of the Tribunal.

The third point is that the Indian Supreme Court has required of Italy, and has accepted from Italy, undertakings to return subsequent to the episode on which India relies. If an undertaking is good enough for its Supreme Court, India should be held to a high burden to show why an undertaking to this Tribunal would not suffice.

Mr President, members of the Tribunal, the fourth point is more complex. It is that for the three and a half years of this dispute, from 15th February 2012, the point of the incident, to the Notification instituting these proceedings on 21st July 2015, there were diplomatic exchanges between the two States in an attempt to resolve the dispute.

³ Transcript, 30 March 2016, pp. 50-51 (Swaroop); Verbatim Record, ITLOS/PV.15/C24/3 (uncorrected), pp. 4-5 (Bethlehem) (Annex IT-34 (c))

Those exchanges, however, as it turned out, were akin to broken telephone conversations between intermediaries representing what they thought were the views of those for whom they spoke. The Parties have misunderstood one another on this issue more than they have understood one another.

Italy has on occasion brought applications before the Indian courts because they thought they understood from their Indian interlocutors that this was the way to resolve the dispute, whereas in reality either Italy misunderstood what India was saying, or those speaking for India did not sufficiently understand the complexity of the issues about which they were talking.

Mr President, members of the Tribunal, the point is simply that the Parties failed, in their diplomatic dialogue, both to sufficiently understand one another, and to find a way through the issues that divide them.

This, together with the risk of a critical deterioration, was the reason why Italy commenced these proceedings in July last year.

As I indicated yesterday, the ITLOS Provisional Measures Order of last August brought a very welcome calm and stability to this matter and to relations between the Parties more generally, and I would note in passing, in the light of what was said yesterday,

that the hope of resolving the dispute through
negotiation is the reason why Italy did not commence
proceedings before July 2015. Of course, before
proceedings commenced, there could be no question of
a provisional measures request.

Before I leave this point, let me turn to the fourth question put by the Tribunal last night. With great respect to our friend, the Ambassador, he is simply wrong on this matter. We have here with us in this hearing Italy's senior Indian counsel in the Delhi proceedings on 16th December 2014. Both Italy and India have also annexed to their respective pleadings a press report on the hearing in question⁴.

It is accurate to say that Sergeant Girone's petition was withdrawn. It is inaccurate to a quite startling degree to say that the Government of India did not oppose that petition.

It is equally inaccurate to suggest that Sergeant Girone simply withdrew his petition. His petition was withdrawn, and a decision made not to resubmit it, in the face both of Indian Government opposition to the petition, and a categorical statement by the Chief Justice of India in the court that he would reject the petition.

Mr President, members of the Tribunal, our

⁴ Annex IT-42; India's ITLOS Written Observations, Annex 45

esteemed colleague, the Indian Ambassador, was not speaking from personal knowledge when he read what he did. Whoever wrote it was simply wrong.

Mr President, members of the Tribunal, let me turn to the ITLOS Provisional Measures Order. It is important that I emphasise a point that may have gotten lost in our analysis of the text of the Order yesterday. We welcomed that Order in its detail and in its nuance and in its careful and deliberate consideration of the issues. We are not seeking to undo it, or to appeal against it in any way.

By the present Request, we are seeking to open a door that ITLOS explicitly left ajar. Paragraph 132 of the Order, which India's counsel failed to address yesterday, made it clear beyond doubt that ITLOS was not addressing the status of the Marines because it considered that this was a matter that would be better addressed by this Tribunal once it had been constituted. We are not seeking a modification of the ITLOS Order, because the ITLOS Order said in terms that it was leaving the issue of the status of the Marines to this Tribunal. Our Request in these proceedings is passing the ITLOS baton to you.

Mr President, members of the Tribunal, I have three brief concluding points to make. The first concerns the issue of whether Sergeant Girone is formally subject to any criminal charges. Despite

Professor Pellet's repeated refrain yesterday that

Sergeant Girone knew that he was accused of murder, it

is in fact common ground between the Parties that

Sergeant Girone is not currently subject to any

charge. There is a debate as to why this is the case,

but who is right about this, and the underlying issues

of Indian law, are not matters that the Tribunal needs

to determine in these proceedings. It is common

ground that the Kerala charge sheet was invalid and

that there has not been a subsequent one⁵.

Mr President, members of the Tribunal, I should add that Mr Bundy referred yesterday to four statutes stipulated in the 18th January 2013 Supreme Court Judgment, and he asserted that accordingly "it was quite clear that the Marines were well aware of the legal statutes under which they would be charged". This is astonishing. The four statutes (which, for example, included the entire Indian Penal Code) together comprise over 1,000 legal provisions and cannot by any stretch of a creative legal imagination be understood as indicating with sufficient precision the charges that might ultimately be brought.

The significance of this point for the Tribunal is

⁵ India's ITLOS Written Observations, paras. 1.17 and 2.13 (Annex IT-33); India's Written Observations (Annex VII Tribunal), para. 2.6; Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 166, line 19-p. 167, line 1 (Bundy); *ibid.*, p. 176, line 16-p. 177, line 5 (Bundy)

that, when it comes to weighing everything in the balance in determining your judgment on whether to prescribe the provisional measure that Italy seeks, the fact that Sergeant Girone has not ever been subject to any lawful charge should weigh in favour of Italy's request that his bail conditions should be relaxed to enable him to return to Italy until the Tribunal has rendered its final award in this case.

My second point goes to the second question posed by the Tribunal last night concerning the reasons that the "Enrica Lexie" was called to go into the port of Kochi. As a preliminary matter, I note that this goes to the merits and is therefore an issue that we will address more fully by reference to the evidence in due course. I confine myself for the moment, therefore, to addressing this issue by reference to the documentation that is already in the record.

The answer to the question comes in three parts.

The first part is the issue of what India communicated to the "Enrica Lexie" at the time. The "Enrica Lexie" was requested by India to proceed to Kochi to assist in the investigation of an incident that the Indian authorities, in their communication to the vessel, characterised as involving a firing on skiffs suspected of piracy. What the vessel subsequently learnt was that the Indian authorities were not in

fact treating the incident as a suspected pirate attack, but were simply saying as such to the "Enrica Lexie". The communication gave no indication that the vessel or anyone on board the vessel was suspected of any wrongdoing⁶.

Second, the true reason for that request, which was not communicated to the "Enrica Lexie" while it was outside India's territorial sea, was to arrest the ship and the individuals on board suspected of killing the two Indian fishermen⁷.

Third, regardless of the reason given in the communication, the "Enrica Lexie" had no choice but to comply with India's direction and to enter India's territorial sea and proceed to anchor at Kochi. The vessel was interdicted in international waters. It was encircled. It was directed to alter course. It was continuously contacted and shadowed until it arrived in Kochi⁸.

All of this evidence comes from Indian documents which are on the record.

Mr President, members of the Tribunal, my concluding point is the following: Italy has sought to

⁶ Inter alia, Annex IT-8, Annex IT-14, Annex IT-5, and Annex IT-39

⁷ Annex IT-9. In an Indian newspaper article of 18 February 2012 (Annex IT-39), the Regional Commander of the Indian Coast Guard was directly quoted as saying: "When Enrica Lexie officials confirmed they had an encounter with pirates, we asked them to sail to Kochi to identify the pirates. We informed them that they were under investigation for the murder of two fishermen only after they reached the outer anchorage off Kochi port."

⁸ Inter alia, Annex IT-9 and Annex IT-7

recognise and to accommodate India's need for
assurance that Sergeant Girone would be returned to
India if this is required by a decision of the
Tribunal.

Italy has gone out of its way to emphasise, solemnly and publicly, time and again, that it undertakes to return Sergeant Girone to India if a decision of this Tribunal so requires. By this undertaking, Italy assumes an international obligation not just to India but also to this Tribunal, the Tribunal to whom Italy chose to turn to resolve this dispute.

Italy has also invited the Tribunal to impose appropriate conditions on Sergeant Girone's return to Italy, conditions that are akin to those to which he is subject in India. Italy has further acknowledged, by its use of the language in the present request of a relaxation of Sergeant Girone's bail conditions, that the Indian Supreme Court would continue to have an interest in the matter. In all of these ways, Italy has sought to recognise and accommodate India's interest.

We have seen nothing similar from India. There has been no recognition of Italy's interests, and of the irreparable prejudice to Italy's rights. There has been no endeavour to accommodate Italy's concerns.

- India's rights and interests can be comprehensively 1 safeguarded by the undertaking offered by Italy. 2 3 Italy's rights and interests can only be safeguarded by the prescription of the provisional measure that 4 Italy requests in these proceedings. 5 Mr President, members of the Tribunal, that 6 7 concludes my submissions. I thank you for your attention. Mr President, may I invite you to ask 8 Sir Michael Wood to the podium, please? 9
- 10 **THE PRESIDENT:** Thank you, Sir Daniel Bethlehem. Now we invite Sir Michael Wood to make his statement.

12 SPEECH BY SIR MICHAEL WOOD

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13 SIR MICHAEL WOOD: Mr President, members of the Tribunal, as Sir Daniel has just said, counsel for India have 14 15 yet to address the various points we made yesterday. This includes those concerning Article 290,9 and in 16 17 this brief statement I shall therefore limit myself to 18 a few points that arose from what Professor Pellet and Mr Bundy said on that matter yesterday, to note some 19 continuing differences, but also a couple of points 20 where India now seems to agree with Italy. 21 22 I shall then say a few words about India's

⁹ Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 23, line 19-p. 25, line 26 (Bethlehem); *ibid.*, p. 54, line 2-p. 62, line 2 (Wood)

pre-judgment argument, and I shall end by replying to

the Tribunal's question no 3 from yesterday evening.

Counsel for India did not address what we said about the very special nature of the jurisdiction of ITLOS under the first sentence of paragraph 5 of Article 290. Or what we said about the relationship between that special jurisdiction and the regular provisional measures jurisdiction under paragraph 1.

The unique paragraph 5 procedure was devised at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea precisely to make Annex VII arbitration more effective, and in doing so, to give a special role to ITLOS.

It is the regular procedure under paragraph 1 which corresponds to the ICJ's jurisdiction under Article 41 of its statute.

On two points concerning provisional measures, the Parties now seem to be largely in agreement. First, Professor Pellet conceded yesterday that (notwithstanding what is said in India's Written Observations¹⁰) provisional measures orders "are not properly res judicata"¹¹. So, unlike the ICJ a couple of weeks ago in the Nicaragua v Colombia case¹², this

 $^{^{10}}$ See, for example, WO, para. 3.10 and fn 38

¹¹ Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 137, lines 7-12 (Pellet)

¹² Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 17 March 2016, paras. 55-88

Tribunal is happily not called upon to consider the case law or the technicalities of the res judicata principle.

Second, Mr Bundy now seems to take more or less the same line as Italy on the role of urgency. As we explained yesterday, if "urgency" is relevant in the context of Article 290, paragraph 1, it refers to the risk of irreparable harm suffered in advance of the issuance of the final award¹³.

Mr Bundy seemed to accept as much yesterday when he said, quoting from the *Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire* case, that:

"... urgency ... in the sense of 'the need to avert a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice may be caused to the rights in interest', is a fundamental condition for the prescription of provisional measures" 14.

What India has not done is address Italy's point that Italy will suffer irreparable prejudice if the Tribunal finds that Italy has jurisdiction, and from now until the final award, Sergeant Girone remains in India. This is the crucial point, and India has so far said nothing about it.

In other respects, however, our friends opposite

¹³ Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 71, line 9-p. 72, line 7 (Wood)

¹⁴ Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 154, lines 11-17 (Bundy)

seem to maintain their unorthodox views about provisional measures. For example, Professor Pellet said that provisional measures had "no role to play when an established situation does not threaten nor jeopardise the outcome of the lawsuit". But that, Mr President, is not the test.

The test is whether harm will be suffered prior to the issuance of the award that could not be remedied in the award. It cannot be denied that, if the final award were in Italy's favour, the harm suffered by the lengthy detention of Sergeant Girone in Delhi would be irremediable.

Mr President, members of the Tribunal, I do not really need to return to the modification versus new measure debate, which forms a major thread in India's written observations, but I cannot resist reacting to Professor Pellet's remarkable assertion yesterday that "clearly an addition is a modification" 16.

Certainly not in this case, for the purpose of deciding whether paragraph 2 of Article 290 is applicable. What matters here is that there is no request to modify the ITLOS Order. Both sides wish to leave it untouched. Italy's request is a request for a new measure, a measure not prescribed by ITLOS, not

¹⁵ Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 186, lines 18-20

¹⁶ Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 138, lines 4-5 (Pellet)

rejected in the *dispositif*, and, as we explained yesterday, explicitly left by ITLOS to this
Tribunal¹⁷.

This is perhaps an unnecessary debate, since even if a change of circumstances were required, as we explained yesterday¹⁸, it is clear that the position in which this Tribunal finds itself is entirely different from that of ITLOS last August.

Professor Pellet insisted yesterday that in August, ITLOS dismissed Italy's second request. Of course, it did not prescribe the measure sought, but what Professor Pellet completely overlooks is the reason it gave, that it was more appropriate for this Tribunal to consider any such request¹⁹.

Mr President, members of the Tribunal, yesterday
Professor Pellet repeated a number of submissions
under the umbrella of, as he put it, pre-judgment of
your final decision. I shall address the central
point he made. He sought to persuade you that Italy's
Request "would not only prejudice but purely and
simply prejudge your decision on the substance of the
case".

He did so by comparing the texts of Italy's

¹⁷ ITLOS Order, para. 132 (Annex IT-35)

¹⁸ Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 54, lines 10-15 (Wood)

¹⁹ ITLOS Order, para. 132 (Annex IT-35)

submission in its Request with paragraph (d) of the
relief which Italy seeks in its Notification and
Statement of Claim. He contended that Italy's

desiderata are the same in both the Notification and
the Request, and the consequence, according to
Professor Pellet, is that:

"... you could not accede to Italy's Request without, by the same token, granting Italy's claim; that is by deciding that India must cease to exercise any measure of restraint with respect to Sergeant Girone, which is precisely one of the submissions in the Notification of Claim by Italy."²⁰

Mr President, members of the Tribunal, that argument is simply wrong. The same comparison of texts could have been done in a number of cases where no pre-judgment of the merits was found, and provisional measures were prescribed. Let me recall one important and relevant example, ITLOS's Order on Provisional Measures in the ARA Libertad case between Argentina and Ghana²¹.

In its Notification instituting proceedings, the main relief sought by Argentina was that Ghana "immediately cease" the violation of a number of

²⁰ Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 186, lines 9-15 (Pellet)

²¹ "ARA Libertad" (Argentina v. Ghana), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 December 2012, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 332

- international obligations which the Argentinian 1
- Notification described as follows: 2
- "(1) the international obligation of respecting 3 the immunities from jurisdiction and execution enjoyed 4
- by such vessel ... 5

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- "(2) the exercise of the right to sail out of the 6 waters subject to the jurisdiction of the coastal 7 State and the right of freedom of navigation enjoyed 8 by the said vessel and its crew ..." 9
- Argentina requested a provisional measure in the 10 following terms: 11
- "... that Ghana unconditionally enables the 12 Argentine warship Frigate ARA Libertad to leave the 13 Tema port and the jurisdictional waters of Ghana and 14 to be resupplied to that end." 15
 - ITLOS then granted a provisional measure which read as follows:
 - "Ghana shall forthwith and unconditionally release the frigate ARA Libertad, shall ensure that the frigate ARA Libertad, its Commander and crew are able to leave the port of Tema and the maritime areas under the jurisdiction of Ghana, and shall ensure that the frigate ARA Libertad is resupplied to that end."
 - Mr President, members of the Tribunal, comparable similarities between what was sought by a party as relief on the merits and what was prescribed in

a provisional measures order have arisen in a number
of other cases before ITLOS, but I do not think I need
take you to them, since the point is the same²².

At this point, Mr President, I would like to return to the *Tehran Hostages* case, which Professor Verdirame addressed yesterday. The Order is at tab 15, but I do not think you need turn it up.

There are two brief comments to add to what Professor Verdirame said. The first is that in *Tehran Hostages*, as in *ARA Libertad*, you will find the same textual correspondence between the relief sought on the merits and the provisional measure requested (and granted) that Professor Pellet would like you to think is determinative of the question of pre-judgment.

The relief sought by the United States in its Application included that the Court adjudge and declare that:

"... the Government of Iran is under a particular obligation immediately to secure the release of all United States nationals currently being detained within the premises of the United States Embassy in Tehran, and to assure that all such persons and all other United States nationals in Tehran are allowed to

²² Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003, ITLOS Reports 2003, p. 10; Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August 1999, ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 280

1 leave Iran safely."²³

In the relevant part, the US request for

provisional measures was in virtually identical terms,

seeking "immediate release" and "prompt and safe

departure from Iran" of the affected US nationals²⁴.

The Court granted that request²⁵.

Mr President, the second point in connection with the *Tehran Hostages* case concerns the nature of the Order. In paragraph 28 of the Order, the Court distinguished between an interim judgment and a provisional measures order. In making its Order, the Court said that what it was doing was different from an interim judgment.

The Order was not based on a prima facie determination of the merits in the United States' favour. It was exclusively designed to preserve rights.

Mr President, members of the Tribunal, the same is true in our case. Contrary to what Professor Pellet said²⁶, if you prescribe the measure sought, you will not have prejudged any of the arguments that may be raised on the merits. Nor will you have prejudged any

²³ United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Order of 15 December 1979, I.C.J. Reports 1979, p. 7, at p. 8, para. 1

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9, para. 2

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 21, para. 47(1)(A).

²⁶ Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 185 and pp. 13-19

of the issues of law and fact that are to be determined at the merits stage.

In short, contrary to Professor Pellet's conclusion, pre-judgment is not a matter of appearances. It cannot be demonstrated by a mere textual comparison between the relief sought and the measure requested. It has to be properly assessed on the facts of each case. In our case, the measure Italy seeks would be provisional in the true sense, and its effects could be entirely reversed if the Tribunal so required in its final award.

Mr President, before concluding, I shall respond to the Tribunal's third question from yesterday evening. The Tribunal asked the Parties to comment on any implications they believe paragraphs 134 and 135 of the ITLOS Order might have for the current proceedings.

In these two paragraphs, ITLOS stated that it was "aware of the grief and suffering of the families of the two Indian fishermen" and "also aware of the consequence that the lengthy restrictions on liberty entail for the two Marines and their families". The Tribunal evidently wanted to indicate that it did not regard the human dimension of this inter-state dispute as an abstraction.

It would not be correct, however, to read, as

Mr Bundy seemed to suggest yesterday²⁷, these two paragraphs as defining the "balance to be struck" in this case. This was clearly not the point of these paragraphs. ITLOS was not trying to "split the suffering". That could never be the way in which justice, including international justice, can serve the interests of victims.

Those interests are served principally by ensuring that a proper process of law and as appropriate a fair trial takes place, and that the truth of what happened is established, and that anyone found guilty of an offence at the end of a domestic criminal process serve a punishment commensurate with the offence.

So far as concerns the families of the fishermen, their interest is in seeing that justice be done. But for reasons we have explained, that does not require that Sergeant Girone, who is to be presumed innocent, stay in India for a lengthy period during which no trial can take place. So the families will not suffer prejudice from the measure sought by Italy.

On the other hand, the consequences that "the lengthy restrictions on liberty" entail for Sergeant Girone and his family must certainly weigh in favour of the provisional measure requested by Italy.

Mr President, members of the Tribunal, yesterday,

²⁷ Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 152, line 18-p. 153, line 6 (Bundy)

Professor Pellet ended his speech by drawing attention
to Chapter 4 of India's Written Observations. He
claimed that India had "very moderately" chosen to
entitle Chapter 4:

"The Tendentious Character of Italy's Request."²⁸
In fact, in its Written Observations, India has once again adopted an exaggerated and polemical tone.
There is no basis whatsoever for the serious assertion that Italy's Request for a provisional measure
"constitutes an abuse of process"²⁹. To suggest that Italy's request corresponds to the so-called "definition" of abuse of process given by
Professor Kolb³⁰ is frankly pretty outrageous.

If it's meant to be dismissive of the serious situation in which Sergeant Girone has found himself over the last four years, and which, if India has its way, will continue potentially for another four years or so, it is unworthy of our friends opposite.

In its Order, ITLOS dealt robustly with similar assertions 31 , and we trust that this Tribunal will do likewise.

Mr President, members of the Tribunal, that

²⁸ Transcript, p. 187, lines 15-22 (Pellet)

²⁹ WO, paras. 4.1

³⁰ WO, para. 4.1 (where the quotation is incorrectly attributed to Professor Marcelo Kohen)

³¹ ITLOS Order, paras. 68-73 (Annex IT-35)

- 1 concludes what I have to say. I would be grateful if
- you would invite the Agent of Italy, Ambassador
- 3 Azzarello, to the podium. I thank you.
- 4 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir Michael. I now give the
- floor to the Agent of Italy, His Excellency,
- 6 Ambassador Azzarello, to present Italy's formal
- 7 submissions.

8 SUBMISSIONS BY THE AGENT

- 9 AMBASSADOR AZZARELLO: Mr President, members of the
- 10 Tribunal, before I read out the formal submissions of
- 11 the Italian Republic, please allow me to express, also
- on behalf of the members of the Italian delegation,
- our profound appreciation and thanks to you,
- Mr President, and the members of the Tribunal.
- We would like to thank the Registrar of the
- 16 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Dr Pulkowski, the
- staff and the court reporter, Ms Claire Hill. We also
- are very grateful to all others who have worked hard
- behind the scenes during this hearing.
- I would like to express our appreciation and
- thanks also, as I did at the beginning of our
- speeches, to the Agent of the Republic of India, the
- 23 Co-Agent and her team.
- 24 Mr President, I shall now read Italy's final
- 25 submissions. They are as follows:

1	"For the reasons given in its Request for the
2	Prescription of Provisional Measures dated
3	11th December 2015 and in the course of the hearing,
4	the Italian Republic requests that the Arbitral
5	Tribunal prescribe the following provisional measure:
6	"India shall take such measures as are necessary
7	to relax the bail conditions on Sergeant Girone in
8	order to enable him to return to Italy, under the
9	responsibility of the Italian authorities, pending the
LO	final determination of the Annex VII Tribunal."
11	I thank you, Mr President.
L2	THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ambassador Azzarello. This
L3	concludes the oral arguments presented by Italy, as
L 4	well as this morning's session. We will continue the
L5	hearing in the afternoon, at 4.30 pm, to hear the
L 6	second round of India's oral arguments.
L7	The hearing stands adjourned.
L 8	(10.43 am)
L 9	(Adjourned until 4.30 pm)
20	(4.40 pm)
21	INDIA'S SECOND ROUND OF ORAL ARGUMENT
22	SPEECH BY MR BUNDY
23	THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. We will now hear the
24	second round of India's oral arguments, in the

arbitration case concerning the "Enrica Lexie"

- incident. I would like to give the floor to Mr Rodman
- 2 Bundy to begin his statement.
- 3 MR BUNDY: Thank you very much, Mr President, members of
- 4 the Tribunal. In this presentation, I shall address
- 5 Italy's continuing failure to show that its request
- for a provisional measure regarding Sergeant Girone is
- 7 justified either by reference to the basic criterion
- 8 of urgency, or because of an imminent risk of
- 9 irreparable prejudice, including on the grounds that
- 10 Sergeant Girone has been the subject of what is
- alleged to be a violation of due process. I will also
- respond to the first, second and fourth questions
- posed by the Tribunal yesterday evening.
- 14 Following me, Professor Pellet will turn back to
- the other issues raised by Italy on the interpretation
- of Article 290 of UNCLOS and on the pre-judgment
- issue.
- The issues that divide the parties on these
- matters are by this time tolerably clear and as
- 20 a consequence, I hope I can be relatively brief. Not
- only have they been debated in these proceedings, but
- virtually all of the issues were fully canvassed
- 23 before ITLOS.
- Moreover, India feels confident that the Tribunal
- is well placed to appreciate the reasons that underlay
- 26 ITLOS's Order of 24th August 2015, in which it did not

accept Italy's request to change the bail status of Sergeant Girone.

That being said, India does not intend to respond to Sir Michael's arguments about whether the Tribunal prima facie has jurisdiction in order to prescribe provisional measures, or the link between the measures and the rights Italy seeks to protect.

In its Order of 24th August 2015, ITLOS dealt with both of these points³², and unlike our opponents on the other side of the bar, India does not intend to second guess or seek to modify the Law of the Sea Tribunal's conclusions on these matters.

So, Mr President, I can turn directly to the question whether Italy has shown any urgency sufficient to justify its request, and I have three points to make in this connection.

First, as I pointed out yesterday, Sir Michael's contention that unlike requests made under Article 290, paragraph 5 of UNCLOS, urgency is not a requirement for the prescription of provisional measures under Article 290, paragraph 1, and I would suggest that that contention flies in the face of the jurisprudence of ITLOS and is contrary to the writings of well-known recognised scholars on the subject.

Let me simply recall that the Special Chamber of

³² Order of 24 August 2015, paras. 54 and 85

ITLOS in the *Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire* case -- and I should note that that case concerned not only a request for provisional measures under Article 290, paragraph 1 of UNCLOS, but also a request to the body that was tasked with deciding the merits of the case -- the Special Chamber of ITLOS stated:

"... urgency is required in order to exercise the power to prescribe provisional measures."33

That is as clear an expression of principle as you can have, and three ICJ precedents were cited by ITLOS when it made that statement.

Second, counsel's argument that India "conflates the requirement of urgency under the first sentence of Article 290, paragraph 5 (which relates to the time when the tribunal has been constituted and is in a position to function) with the requirement of a real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice prior to a final decision of the arbitral tribunal" is neither correct nor, as my good friend asserted, "a basic flaw in India's reasoning"³⁴.

In fact, the requirement of a real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice is precisely what is meant by urgency, and that was also made very clear by

³³ Order of 25 April 2015, para. 42

³⁴ Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 72

the Special Chamber in the Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire case³⁵.

Obviously, in its order of 24th August, the Law of the Sea Tribunal did not find that there was any urgency justifying Italy's request to relax the bail status of Sergeant Girone based on the circumstances that existed at the time. The question really is whether there are any new circumstances that have arisen since the Order that now justifies Italy's new request, and the answer to that is no, as we explained yesterday.

Sir Michael tries to avoid this problem by asserting that the two procedures set out in paragraphs 1 and 5 of Article 290 are quite different³⁶. His argument, and this gets to my third point, is that there is a temporal difference between provisional measures that may be ordered by ITLOS under paragraph 5, which are only designed to deal with the situation up to the time that the Annex VII tribunal is constituted, and measures under paragraph 1, which can last to the end of the proceedings.

In both cases, however, a showing of urgency is required based on the particular circumstances. That is what lies behind the stipulation in Article 290,

³⁵ ITLOS Special Chamber, Order of 25 April 2015, para. 42

³⁶ Transcript, 30 March, p. 54

paragraph 1 that provisional measures must be
appropriate "under the circumstances", and in
paragraph 5, where there has to be a situation of
urgency.

Moreover, my learned friend's argument is contrary to what Italy argued before ITLOS last August. There, Sir Michael emphasised that the notion that there is a temporal limitation to the duration of any provisional measures under Article 290, paragraph 5 "is simply wrong". In Sir Michael's words:

"That is clear from the practice of this Tribunal."37

He was referring to the ITLOS Tribunal. He also contended:

"When the Law of the Sea Tribunal acts under paragraph 5 of Article 290, the measures it prescribes may in principle last through to the arbitral tribunal's final award on the merits." 38

That is precisely the basis on which Italy formulated its second request before ITLOS. That request was not for a short-term solution pending the constitution of your Tribunal; rather Italy requested a provisional measure to relax the bail conditions of the two Marines, so that Sergeant Girone could return

³⁷ ITLOS/PV.15/CR24/3, p. 10

³⁸ ITLOS/PV.15/CR24/1, p. 23

to and stay in Italy "throughout the duration of the proceedings before the Annex VII Tribunal".

The same request is made to your Tribunal. But just as Italy had to demonstrate urgency last August, based on the circumstances that then existed, so also does it have to show that there is urgency based on the circumstances existing at the time of its new request.

Whether these are termed "new facts" or "changed circumstances", as provided for in Article 290, paragraph 2 of UNCLOS, really doesn't matter in this respect, although paragraph 2 is important, as Professor Pellet will discuss, in other ways.

But either way, circumstances have to exist now that didn't exist last August justifying the request. And this is what Italy has not been able to demonstrate.

Apart from the issuance of ITLOS's Order in August which did not accept Italy's second request, and thus cannot constitute a reason for accepting the same request now, nothing had changed as of 11th December 2015 giving rise to urgency or justifying the new request.

At this point, Mr President, it may be helpful for me to respond to the first and fourth questions posed by the Tribunal after yesterday's session.

The first question was what were the "intense diplomatic efforts" that were required to ensure the Marines would return to Italy in 2013, and frankly, Sir Daniel did not really contribute anything to the question this morning. I will try and be more complete.

The Tribunal will recall that Italy sent a Note Verbale on 11th March 2013 to India saying that the Marines would not return upon the expiry of the leave they had been granted by India's Supreme Court in February.³⁹

Italy's Note also indicated that Italy considered that a controversy between the two parties, Italy and India, had been established by that time, the controversy had been established by that time, and this was the reason for the Marines' non-return.

Note if you would, Mr President, and members of the Tribunal, that Italy's view that a controversy had been established by March 2013 was more than two years before Italy filed its Annex VII Notification stating that there was a dispute between the Parties and indicating that Italy would seek provisional measures. I mentioned yesterday that time lag is not conducive to an argument based on urgency.

Italy's Note was contrary to the personal

³⁹ Annex 20 to Italy's Notification of 26 June 2015

undertaking that the Italian Ambassador had given in support of the Marines' application for permission to return to Italy for four weeks to vote in the Italian elections.

India immediately responded on 12th March 2013 by means of a diplomatic Note to Italy. India's Ministry of External Affairs informed Italy that the latter's position was not acceptable to the Government of India, and that the failure of the Marines to return within the stipulated time limit would be a breach of the sovereign undertakings given by the Republic of Italy to the Supreme Court of India.

The Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs responsible for Western Europe then met the Ambassador of the European Union on 14th March 2013. In that meeting, the Secretary conveyed the position that Italy's decision not to send the Marines back at the expiration of the permission granted to them was a breach of Italy's undertakings. The EU Ambassador was also informed that the breach of an express undertaking by one of the EU Member States ran counter to the EU's support for the propagation of the principle of the Rule of Law and an independent judiciary, values that the EU holds in the highest regard. He added that India did not desire an intervention by the EU on what was essentially

1 a bilateral issue.

In the event, the Marines did return within the stipulated time, but this was as a result of what I have said were intense diplomatic efforts.

The Tribunal's fourth question posed yesterday concerns the petition that Sergeant Girone lodged with the Supreme Court and later withdrew in December 2014. The Tribunal asked how the apparent discrepancy between India's statement that "in none of the hearings mentioned, the Union of India objected to the relaxation of bail conditions", and Italy's statement that the Government of India, through its Assistant Solicitor-General, "opposed the petition of Sergeant Girone", how those two statements can be reconciled.

Yesterday evening, India checked the position with the Assistant Solicitor-General, who was present at the December 2014 session before the Supreme Court, and who would have been here today but for the unfortunate fact that he fell ill over the weekend.

India stands by what it said: the petition was not opposed by India and the court took note of the Marines' withdrawal of their petition and ruled accordingly, without soliciting the views of India or relying on them.

Italy itself has asserted that the petition was withdrawn because the Supreme Court, not India, had

1 made it clear that the petition would be rejected.

The support for that statement by Italy is a news account filed by it, which is in annex IT-42.

That account indicates that the Government of
India did not oppose Sergeant Latorre's application
because he made an application at the same time, and
it does not indicate that India took any different
position with respect to Sergeant Girone. Not a word
about Indian opposition to the petition is mentioned
in the press report.

As to how the Supreme Court would have ruled, it's impossible to speculate, since the application was withdrawn before a ruling could be made. But what we do know from the record that is in this case is that the subsequent applications of Sergeant Latorre which were on health grounds were not opposed by India, and were granted by the Supreme Court. But as I pointed out yesterday, when it comes to Sergeant Girone, he made no further application that the Supreme Court was called upon to rule on after February 2013, that was the application that led to the incident I just discussed a few moments ago, in response to the Tribunal's first question.

It was only in July 2015, 29 months later, that Italy, in its request for provisional measures to ITLOS, requested a measure to relax Sergeant Girone's

bail conditions. Again, as I said, that scarcely
supports the notion that Italy or the Marines
considered that there was urgency or a risk of
irreparable prejudice, a subject I will turn to next,
in connection with Italy's due process arguments.

Mr President, every one of Italy's counsel yesterday harped on the argument that Sergeant Girone has been deprived of due process, and Sir Daniel again raised the point this morning.

Despite Sir Daniel's profession yesterday that

Italy's request was about the future, not the past⁴⁰,

he, as well as Mr Swaroop, Sir Michael,

Professor Politi and even Professor Verdirame dealt at

length with the allegation that India has deprived

Sergeant Girone of due process, particularly by not

filing formal charges against him for over three

years, and that this supports the appropriateness of

Italy's request.

I fully rebutted this argument yesterday when
I reviewed what actually happened with respect to
Italy's and the Marines' numerous applications before
the Indian courts, and I assure the Tribunal that I do
not intend to repeat that presentation this afternoon.
The record speaks for itself, and can be reviewed by
the Tribunal. There was absolutely no lack of due

⁴⁰ Transcript, 30 March 2016, pp. 21-22

process. The Indian courts reviewed and often acted favourably to all of the Marines' petitions, whether they were for the relaxation of bail conditions, removing the case from Kerala, or other matters.

But due process entails a system of law-based rules. And it is precisely because India is a Rule of Law country that there are strict procedural steps and requirements that must be adhered to in a criminal case when it comes to investigating the facts, drawing up a charge sheet, or framing charges.

The plain fact is that these matters were impeded because of the Marines' constant applications challenging the jurisdiction of the Kerala courts, challenging NIA's right to carry out the investigation -- an investigation which Italy itself had stated it would provide all co-operation to -- challenging the jurisdiction of the Special Court, and then finally asking, only in 2014, the Supreme Court to rule on the question of jurisdiction and immunities, only to change their mind a year later.

Italy and the Marines had every right to lodge these applications, and to make use of the legal remedies that were available under Indian law, and they did so liberally, one might even say excessively.

But having resorted to these tactics, Italy cannot now turn around and argue that Sergeant Girone has

been deprived of due process because he was never formally charged, when that process was blocked because of the very writs filed on behalf of the Marines. No, Mr President, members of the Tribunal, contrary to Professor Verdirame's assertion yesterday⁴¹, there has been no failure of the Indian legal system.

Moreover, I was also somewhat surprised by Sir
Daniel's statement this morning that Italy brought
applications before the Indian courts because it
understood from so-called interlocutors that this was
the way to resolve the dispute. With respect,
Mr President, that argument is not credible. The way
to resolve the dispute was not by filing applications
challenging every step in the process before the
Indian courts over a period of more than three years.

The fact of the matter is the Marines never filed a writ of habeas corpus complaining that they were being held without charges. Moreover, as early as 2012, and certainly by March 2013, when Italy sent its Note Verbale stating that the Marines would not return to India, and that a legal controversy with India was established, Italy could have started these proceedings and applied for provisional measures. It did not.

⁴¹ Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 105

Professor Politi argued that there is no a priori level of "gravity" of an offence that may justify non-compliance with protecting fundamental rights of an accused. In his words:

"... even when the gravest crimes of international concern are involved, guarantees of respect for the rights of the accused are key elements of the legal framework for their prosecution and punishment."42

Yet the rights of the Marines have been respected at every stage of the Indian judicial proceedings where the Marines were never prevented or precluded from resorting to judicial remedies.

That being said, the gravity of an offence certainly can be a relevant factor when setting bail conditions. Mr President, if I am accused of shoplifting a chocolate bar from the convenience store across the street from the Hilton Hotel, you can be sure that my bail conditions will be different than if I am accused of murdering a citizen of The Hague.

States have a right and duty to exercise criminal jurisdiction, and to impose restrictions on the liberty of movement of the accused in relation to, and as a function of, the seriousness of the alleged offence, and that is hardly a breach of due process.

Here, the conditions of Sergeant Girone's bail

⁴² Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 83

cannot be said to be disproportionate when measured against the gravity of the offence of which he is accused.

But in addition to these factors, there is a more general problem with Italy's approach to the "due process/appropriateness" argument. This problem emerged very clearly from Sir Michael's pleadings yesterday when he said that there were important due process considerations relevant in this case.

According to Sir Michael:

"Those due process considerations arise in relation to India's unlawful exercise of jurisdiction under UNCLOS, specifically an exercise of jurisdiction over an Italian military official, Sergeant Girone, in respect of his official functions, on behalf of Italy."

And Sir Michael added:

"These considerations are intimately and inextricably linked to Italy's rights at issue in these proceedings." 43

But here is the problem, Mr President.

22 Sir Michael simply assumes what Italy has to prove at 23 the merits stage. He claims that due process

considerations are important for Italy's present

request because India acted unlawfully under UNCLOS

⁴³ Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 76

and Sergeant Girone has immunity. But those are
merits issues. And that underscores the point that
Professor Pellet has made that Italy's request for
provisional measures does entail a pre-judgment of the

merits.

At this point, I begin to trespass onto

Professor Pellet's territory, so I will simply

conclude this main part of my intervention by saying

that Italy has not satisfied the necessary condition

of urgency for its request, and that its arguments

that its request is justified because Sergeant Girone

has been deprived of due process are unsustainable.

However, before asking that the floor be given to Professor Pellet, permit me, Mr President, to respond to the second question posed by the Tribunal. This was:

"What were the reasons for the 'Enrica Lexie' to be called to the port of Kochi?"

Kochi is the nearest port to the place of the incident. The local police received information about the incident through a call from the sea. The Coast Guard and Indian Marine Rescue Co-ordination Centre in Mumbai were alerted, and a preliminary analysis of the situation from plotting showed that there were six vessels, including the "Enrica Lexie", in the area where the firing took place. Phone contacts were

obtained for each vessel, and the "Enrica Lexie" was
the first vessel to be contacted over the phone by the
Marine Rescue Co-ordination Centre.

1.3

On enquiry, the captain and another officer on board the "Enrica Lexie" confirmed that there was a firing incident from the ship. The captain also informed that they had sent a notice about the incident to the United Kingdom Marine Trade Operations.

On request from the Marine Rescue Co-ordination

Centre, the captain e-mailed a copy of the same to the

Centre the same day.

I would now like to read out from the e-mail sent to the captain of the "Enrica Lexie" by the Centre in Mumbai on the evening of the incident:

"Understand there has been piracy/firing incident by your vessel on a suspicious skiff at 1600 hours LT [local time] off Allepey ...

"You are requested to head to Kochi and establish communication with Indian Coast Guard for further deposition/clarification. Request ETA Kochi."

That communication, Mr President, by its plain terms, indicates that there was no preconceived mindset of the Indian authorities to arrest the ship or anyone on board. While this is obviously clearly a merits issue, the e-mail refers to two possibilities

- confronted by the Indian authorities, piracy and 1 a firing incident. Therefore, in order to clarify 2 what happened, the vessel was requested -- those are 3 the words -- to head to Kochi, and there are no 4 grounds whatsoever for Sir Daniel's assertion this 5 6 morning that the purpose of the request was to arrest 7 the ship and the individuals on board suspected of killing the two Indian fishermen. 8
- It was only after four days of examination and investigation, and after the local authorities were satisfied that there was prima facie evidence that the firing came from the two Marines resulting in two unarmed fishermen being killed, that an arrest was made on 19th February 2012.
- 15 Mr President, that concludes my presentation,
 16 I thank the court for its attention, and I would be
 17 grateful if Professor Pellet could now be called to
 18 the podium.
- 19 **THE PRESIDENT:** Thank you, Mr Bundy. I now call on 20 Professor Pellet to make his statement.

21 SPEECH BY PROFESSOR PELLET

- 22 **PROFESSOR PELLET:** Thank you very much, Mr President.
- 23 Mr President, members of the Tribunal, a brief 24 preliminary remark, if I may. Our friends on the 25 other side are unfair when they complain that we have

not answered their yesterday morning's pleadings fully
during our first round. May I recall that we had two
hours to digest their three hours of pleadings
prepared during weeks?

Moreover, I note that they have had a full night to answer our first round, and that they have chosen to limit their reply to a strict minimum. Anyway, somebody has to have the last word, and very logically, this belongs to the Respondent.

This being said, as I did yesterday, I will deal this afternoon both with: Italy's argument concerning an alleged change in the circumstances which should lead you to uphold the Italian submission concerning Sergeant Girone, which the ITLOS declined to prescribe; and I will also answer what Italy had to say with respect to our pre-judgment argument.

In both cases, I will abstain from repeating what I have said yesterday, which we fully maintain.

I will endeavour to answer Italy's argument from yesterday and this morning's arguments, in as much as we have not yet had the opportunity to fully respond.

In fact, Mr President, both issues relate to the interpretation and application in this case of Article 290 of UNCLOS. I will first show that we are indeed facing a request to modify the ITLOS Order of 24th August, which demands evidence of a change of

1 circumstance by the Claimant.

I will then deal with the relationship between the orders prescribed by the ITLOS on the one hand and those emanating from Annex VII tribunals on the other hand, and show that in the present case the possible limitations on the jurisdiction of the Hamburg Tribunal have played no role in its decision not to grant Italy's submissions. The reason for this decision was that it would not preserve equally the rights of the Parties.

This remains valid absent any change in the circumstances, a point I dealt with at some length yesterday so I will only add brief considerations as a rebuttal to some arguments made by Italy.

Lastly, I will come back briefly on the pre-judgment argument.

Mr President, members of the Tribunal, contrary to what my opponent and friend, Sir Michael, said yesterday morning, it is in the nature of provisional measures to enjoy some kind of stability, which implies that they cannot be modified or supplemented without good reasons. Indeed, the measures provided for in Article 290 are no exception to the general rule.

Leaving aside the other requirements for prescribing provisional measures (urgency, bonus fumus

juris or prima facie jurisdiction) and I apologise to Sir Daniel, who appears not to like Latin, leaving these requirements aside, they have been already dealt with by Rodman Bundy, I will show that this provision does demand that modifications to an existing order prescribing (or declining to prescribe) provisional measures be justified by a material change of circumstances.

- Mr President, I am a bit ashamed to have to come back to this not so complex but rather long and precise provision with which my learned friend played leapfrog. He described at length paragraph 1, then jumped to paragraph 5. But between 1 and 5, Mr President, there are 2, 3 and 4, all those paragraphs totally passed over in silence by Sir Michael, a very telling silence conspicuously observed by all our colleagues on the other side of the podium. And yet they are quite -- albeit unequally -- relevant for our purpose.
- Clearly, the crucial paragraph is paragraph 2, and
 I read it:
 - "Provisional measures may be modified or revoked as soon as the circumstances justifying them have changed or ceased to exist."
 - This is the core principle. Provisional measures may be modified in case of change or termination of

the circumstances which had justified their

prescription. A change of circumstances is needed,

3 contrary to Sir Michael's assertion⁴⁴.

Paragraphs 3 and 4 are less central but not insignificant. They show that the same rules apply to the prescription and the modification of provisional measures. And this takes us to paragraph 1.

This is the general provision, I won't read it again, I am sure you know it by heart, but,

Mr President, members of the Tribunal, let me draw your attention to the most important aspects: (i)

I will come back a bit later to the preservation of the respective rights of the parties; (ii) here again it is an issue of circumstances, which clearly implies that absent any change, any request for modification of a previous order must be dismissed; and (iii) please note that whatever may be the tribunal which prescribes the provisional measures, whether the ITLOS or an Annex VII Tribunal, they are, in principle, and subject to paragraph 2, decided "pending the final decision".

And then comes paragraph 5. It is reproduced in full in your folders, but I only read what is of direct relevance for us now:

"Pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal

⁴⁴ Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 53, line 21 (Mr Wood)

to which a dispute is being submitted under this section, any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties or, failing such agreement within two weeks from the date of the request for provisional measures, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ... may prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures in accordance with this article if it considers that prima facie the tribunal which is to be constituted would have jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation so requires. Once constituted, the tribunal to which the dispute has been submitted may modify, revoke or affirm those provisional measures, acting in conformity with paragraphs 1 to 4."

"... acting in conformity with paragraphs 1 to 4."

I emphasise this, we are clearly sent back to the general conditions for either adopting or modifying provisional measures.

Paragraphs 125 and 126 of the ITLOS Order of last August build on these provisions: in these passages, and you have them in your folders, ITLOS simply describes the framework in which it acts, nothing less, nothing more.

Mr President, members of the Tribunal, our opponents have come down with a sledgehammer to try to convince you that the ITLOS has only done half of a job, and left the other half for this Tribunal. To

that end, Sir Michael, and, to a lesser extent, Sir Daniel, relied heavily on, first, the separate opinion of Judge Mensah appended to the Order of 3rd December 2001 of the ITLOS in the MOX case; second, Order no 3 of the Annex VII Tribunal in the MOX case of 24th June 2003; and the last August Order of the ITLOS.

I will briefly comment on each of these documents in turn. Judge Mensah's opinion, appended to the 2001 ITLOS Order, first. Mr President, I have the greatest and most sincere respect for Judge Mensah, but I note that his Opinion is separate, which means that, in spite of his well-known persuasive powers, his view was not shared by the majority. And the Order contents itself to mention that the ITLOS acts on the basis of Article 290, paragraphs 1 and 5, without discussing the relations between both provisions nor the special limitations which would apply to the ITLOS jurisdiction in this respect. I refer in particular to paragraphs 63 to 66 of the Order of ITLOS⁴⁵.

I also note, Mr President, that Judge Mensah was presiding the Annex VII Tribunal constituted in the MOX case, which takes us to Order No 3 of that Tribunal. I do not quite understand why my learned colleagues, both Sir Daniel and Sir Michael, rely so

⁴⁵ ITLOS, Order, 3 December 2001, *The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures*, paras. 63-66

heavily on this Order⁴⁶. It indeed does not help
Italy's case at all (the most relevant extracts are at
tab 6 of your folders).

First, I note that in paragraph 39, the Tribunal confirmed that it was due to apply "the provisions of paragraphs 2 to 4" of Article 290; and I stress, of paragraph 2, the provision concerning the modification of a previous Order on provisional measures.

Second, in paragraph 40, the MOX Tribunal accepted that a longer delay than anticipated could constitute:

"... a change in the circumstances that would, if necessary, warrant a modification [again, a modification, Mr President] of the provisional measures prescribed by ITLOS in accordance with Article 290, paragraph 5 of the Convention."

But, first, in our case, the very special circumstance which could have warranted such a modification in the MOX case does not exist. As a reminder, Order No 3, the one you have on the screen, deals together with the "Request for Further [looks very much like 'additional'] Provisional Measures" and the "suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits", and in this Order, the Tribunal effectively decided "that further proceedings in the case are suspended until not later than

⁴⁶ Transcript, 30 March 2016, pp. 23-25 (Mr Bethlehem) and pp. 56-57 (Mr Wood)

1 1st December 2003"47.

2 For the sake of completeness, I recall that on 3 14th November 2003, the MOX Tribunal decided that:

"... further proceedings in the case shall remain suspended until the European Court of Justice has given judgment or the Tribunal otherwise determines."

Of course, no such circumstance exists in the present case. In August, the ITLOS was perfectly aware of the approximate length of the present proceedings. Second, in spite of this indisputable new circumstance, which could not have been foreseen by ITLOS in the MOX case when it adopted its Order, the MOX Annex VII Tribunal dismissed Ireland's Request for "further" provisional measures⁴⁹.

Third, in paragraph 41, the MOX Tribunal expressly indicates that:

"Although the language of Article 290 is not in all respects identical to that of Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Tribunal considers that it should have regard to the law and practice of that Court, as well as to the law

⁴⁷ *Ireland v. United Kingdom (MOX Plant Case)*, Order No. 3 on Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, and Request for further Provisional Measures, 24 June 2003, *dispositif*, point 1

⁴⁸ Ireland v. United Kingdom (MOX Plant Case), Order No. 4, Further Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, 14 November 2003, dispositif, point 1

⁴⁹ *Ireland v. United Kingdom (MOX Plant Case)*, Order No. 3 on Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, and Request for further Provisional Measures, 24 June 2003, paras. 62 and *dispositif*, points 2 and 3

and practice of ITLOS in considering provisional
measures."

This directly contradicts Sir Michael's robust assertion:

"Instead of referring you to that case [he was speaking of the 2003 Order], the only case directly on point, India seeks to rely on the limited case law of the ICJ on the modification of provisional measures.

In our submission, such reliance is misplaced. In none of the cases was the ICJ acting under

Article 290, paragraph 1, following a prescription of provisional measures under the special procedure of paragraph 5."50

In that same paragraph, the MOX Tribunal stresses that it is for the Party requesting provisional measures to establish "that the circumstances are such as to justify the measures sought". Not only Italy has not proven such a change, but it denies that a change of circumstance is necessary to get its submission granted⁵¹.

Now, Mr President, let me go back to the question of whether or not the ITLOS has limited itself to prescribing provisional measures only in as much as they are called for by extreme urgency, although

⁵⁰ Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 58, lines 1-8 (Mr Wood)

⁵¹ *Ibid.* See also the second round presentation of Mr Bethlehem, par. 11

I deem this fascinating legal discussion totally irrelevant for the present case.

Whether Judge Mensah is right or not does not really matter, and I accept that he may well be right. As Sir Michael noted yesterday morning⁵², India had mentioned the idea, in the proceedings before the ITLOS, that the ITLOS could only decide under paragraph 5 of Article 290 if it considered that the urgency is such that it requires the pronouncement of provisional measures before the constitution of the Annex VII Tribunal. This it did.

But this does not mean that its findings can be turned down by this Tribunal absent any new circumstance, or that its decision only applies until the Annex VII Tribunal is constituted. Clearly, in the present case, the ITLOS reasons for not granting Italy's second submission are not based on, I would say, its "pre-Annex VII Tribunal functions"; it bears on the very substance of Italy's submission. It discusses the Parties' arguments, and it concludes that the submission is not appropriate. The same reasons still hold true.

23 Let me then comment a bit more in depth on the 24 ITLOS Order of 24th August 2015. You will find the 25 relevant paragraphs in your folders under tab 7.

⁵² Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 59, lines 20-21 and p. 60, lines 1-2 (Mr Wood)

According to Sir Daniel, in that Order, ITLOS stated:

"... explicitly that it would not address the situation of the Marines as that was a matter to be addressed by this Tribunal, once constituted."53

With respect this is not exactly what the ITLOS said -- well, it is not at all what the ITLOS said.

The main passage of the Order for which Sir Daniel and Sir Michael showed great enthusiasm (it was again shown this morning) 54 is paragraph 132. It reads as follows:

"Considering that, since it will be for the

Annex VII arbitral tribunal to adjudicate the merits

of the case, the Tribunal does not consider it

appropriate to prescribe provisional measures in

respect of the situation of the two Marines because

that touches upon issues related to the merits of the

case."

Therefore, it appears that one of the reasons why the ITLOS has not granted Italy's submission (b) is that it touched upon issues related to the merits of the case. As I have shown yesterday⁵⁵, it touches on the merits so much that adjudging it would amount to

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 26, lines 24-26 (Mr Bethlehem). See also *ibid.*, pp. 55-56 (Mr Wood)

⁵⁴ Mr Bethlehem, paras. 2 and 11 and Mr Wood, para. 8

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 181-184

1 prejudging the merits.

In conformity with the constant jurisprudence of both ITLOS and the ICJ, an Order on provisional measures must not prejudge "any questions relating to the merits" 56.

While it is indeed true that the ITLOS considered, in paragraph 126, that the submissions by Italy "will not equally preserve the respective rights of both Parties until the constitution of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal", this of course does not mean that granting submission (b) now would better preserve the rights of both Parties.

It is impossible to see why what was true in

August has become erroneous next March, and obviously,

for making this finding, the ITLOS has not based

itself on the exceptional urgency (or non-urgency) for

granting or refusing to grant the requested measure,

but the ITLOS exclusively based itself on the fact

that such a measure would not preserve India's rights.

This was true last summer, it is true today. Such a finding has nothing to do with the timing, before or after the constitution of this Tribunal; it is true or not. If it is not, then the ITLOS erred. Contrary to

⁵⁶ ITLOS, Order, 22 November 2013, *The Arctic Sunrise Case (Kingdom of the Netherlands* v. *Russian Federation), Provisional Measures*, para. 100 and I.C.J., Order, 13 December 2013, *Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua* v. *Costa Rica); Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica* v. *Nicaragua), Provisional Measures, Reports* 2013, p. 408, para. 38

1 Italy, we think that it was entirely right.

Now, Mr President, things being what they are,
I repeat, respectfully, that this Tribunal is neither
an appellate body nor a court of cassation: it is not
called to substitute its own appreciation for that of
the ITLOS. What it can do, however, is to admit that
a change of circumstances calls for a reversal of the
ITLOS decision. But indeed, first, it would be rather
extraordinary that, within the three months and a half
between 24th August (the date when the ITLOS Order was
issued) and 11th December 2015 (the date when Italy
made its new Request for provisional measures)
a change of circumstances justifying a modification of
the Order would have occurred.

Second, as very clearly recalled by the MOX Tribunal that I have quoted a moment ago^{57} , the burden of proof falls upon Italy. The Claimant State has not discharged this burden.

I repeat, Mr President, that I do not intend to reiterate what I have said yesterday at some length.

I will only pick up and summarily answer the points made by Italy's counsel which might be seen as new or incompletely answered.

In his general presentation of Italy's case, Sir

Daniel seemed to consider that the change of situation

⁵⁷ See above, para. Error! Reference source not found.

lay in the constitution of this Tribunal. This would be the change of circumstance.

That, if I may, is not a credible proposition. Of course the ITLOS, when it issued its decision, knew that the Tribunal would be created on the basis of Annex VII, and it had, as we all had, an idea of the likely length of the proceedings. Contrary to what was the case in the MOX case⁵⁸, there is no special reason to envisage that this "idea of duration" would have been wrong.

This Tribunal has been constituted rather quickly, it works efficiently, the schedule it has fixed is rather tight.

In the same vein, Sir Michael insists on the fact that "both Parties have taken steps, following the Order of 24th August, to suspend all criminal proceedings" 59. As I said yesterday 60, this is a rather bizarre and paradoxical argument. You ask for provisional measures, they are partly granted, and you invoke the order granting them for requesting a modification of that order.

I am afraid, Mr President, that this is about all I can say on the question of change of circumstances.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 61, lines 2-4 (Mr Wood)

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 138-141

Italy itself is so conscious of the absence of any change of circumstance that Sir Michael, relayed by Sir Daniel, bravely asserted that:

"Italy is not asking this Tribunal to 'modify, revoke or affirm' the provisional measure prescribed by ITLOS in August 2015 which concerned a stay of proceedings. Instead, Italy requests this Tribunal to prescribe a so-called additional provisional measure under paragraph 1 of Article 290."61

May I recall that the ITLOS precisely declined to prescribe this same measure? This morning,

Sir Michael made much of my assertions that an addition is a modification; 62 it might be debatable in some cases, but certainly not when the "addition" is made after the tribunal or another tribunal has formally declined to grant the request.

In any case, Italy's tactic is clearly an admission that it is incapable of establishing the existence of a change of circumstance.

Mr President, I now turn to my last point, or, say, my two twin last points: granting Italy's submission would indeed preserve Italy's rights, but would also indeed prejudice India's rights and prejudge the outcome of the case.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 61, lines 13-19 (Mr Wood)

⁶² See para. 6 (Mr Wood)

1 Let me start with a curious argument made again by
2 Sir Michael:

"Sergeant Girone is only in India as a result of conduct by India which Italy alleges [in these proceedings] to have been unlawful."63

This is exactly so, and it evidently confirms my argument: granting Italy's request would mean that you consider that India's conduct has been unlawful. This is what Italy must prove. This is what it has not proven, and what anyway it can prove only at the merits stage. If you were to accept its submission, it would necessarily decide -- and this means, in the circumstances, prejudge -- that India's conduct was unlawful.

I have also some doubts on Professor Verdirame's assertions that:

"... principles that govern the question of pre-judgment are found in the Order on provisional measures of the International Court of Justice in the Tehran Hostages case."64

In any event, I note that in this judgment, the Court dismissed Iran's claim that:

"The purpose of the United States request appears to be not to obtain a judgment, interim or final, on

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 73, lines 5-7

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 107, lines 20-23

the merits of its claim, but to preserve the substance of the rights which it claims pendente lite."65

What is important in this passage, also quoted by Professor Verdirame⁶⁶, is the emphasis put by the ICJ on the purpose of the US "to preserve the substance of its rights", but this cannot be the purpose of Italy in the present case. The object of this case is to determine whether India or Italy is entitled to judge the accused. Sergeant Girone's stay in Delhi by no means jeopardises the substance of Italy's claimed right.

According to Italy, India's rights would be fully preserved due to the undertaking that Italy is ready to make, to undertake that it would return Sergeant Girone to India in case the Tribunal decides in India's favour⁶⁷. Fair enough, but why such an undertaking would be more valuable legally speaking than India's guarantees? If the Tribunal decides in favour of Italy, India would of course let Girone be judged in Italy for the murder of which he is accused.

As for the assertions of good faith multiplied by Italy's representatives, let me be clear,

Mr President: despite regrettable incidents in the

⁶⁵ I.C.J., Order, 15 December 1979, *United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Provisional Measures, Reports 1979*, p. 16, para. 28

⁶⁶ Transcript, 30 March 2016, p. 109, lines 3-7

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 106-114 (Mr Verdirame)

past, India does not put into question the good faith
with which these proposals have been made before the
Tribunal. However, the doubts on Italy's ability to
comply remain.

However, Dr Chadha will come back on the question just received from the Tribunal in some minutes.

Sir Michael declared to be surprised by the use of the adverb "equally" in the ITLOS Order⁶⁸. This astonishment confirms that Italy definitely does not accept the ITLOS Order, and tries to obtain from this Tribunal to put it into question.

It also shows that Italy considers that its rights must prevail over India's rights. Mr President, are not the deaths of two Indian fishermen, the pain and sufferings of their families and relatives, at least equal to the partial limitations of liberty endured by Sergeant Girone? This is our interpretation of the word "equally" deliberately inserted in the Order by the ITLOS.

Clearly, Italy's interpretation of this equality is different. Professor Verdirame, for example, declared:

"While India's concerns about its rights are, of course, important, the proper way of addressing these concerns cannot be one that reduces an individual to

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75 (Mr Wood)

- a sort of collateral to guarantee performance of
- a State's obligations. Such an approach would be
- 3 incompatible with fundamental considerations of
- 4 humanity, due process and justice, and is not in any
- way appropriate."69
- Not a word for the Indian victims, and this is
- 7 a constant trait of the Italian pleadings, as it was
- 8 in August⁷⁰.
- 9 Mr President, members of the Tribunal, thank you
- 10 very much for your kind attention, and Mr President,
- I would like to ask you to call India's Agent,
- 12 Dr Neeru Chadha, to the bar.
- 13 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Pellet. I give the
- 14 floor to Dr Chadha to make a statement and make the
- 15 final presentation.
- 16 CLOSING STATEMENT AND SUBMISSIONS BY THE AGENT
- 17 DR CHADHA: Thank you, Mr President. Mr President,
- honourable members of this Tribunal, I will make some
- 19 brief concluding remarks, answer question 3 and the
- question posed by the Tribunal to me a little while
- 21 ago, and present India's submission.
- 22 India, in its Written Observations and oral
- pleadings, has demonstrated that the request for

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⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110 (Mr Verdirame)

⁷⁰ ITLOS/PV.15/C24/2, 10 August 2015, afternoon, pp. 43-44 (Mr Pellet) (Annex IT-34(b))

additional provisional measures by Italy is in fact a request for modification of provisional measures already prescribed by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea by its Order dated 24th August 2015, and therefore is not in consonance with the requirements of Article 290 of UNCLOS.

In the present context, India also wishes to reiterate what was observed by ITLOS in its Order, which was shortly also stated by Professor Pellet. The Tribunal categorically held that it does not consider both the requests made by Italy appropriate, in view of the legal requirement of Article 290 of UNCLOS that any provisional measure must protect the rights of both parties. In this respect, India had drawn the attention of the Tribunal to paragraphs 125 to 127 of the ITLOS Order.

Italy asserts that paragraph 125, where the Tribunal talks of preserving the rights of both parties, was relevant only until the constitution of the Annex VII Tribunal, and it is open for this Tribunal to relook at the matter.

Without going into further debate on this matter, since Professor Pellet has dwelled at length on this matter, India's concern is to reiterate, Mr President, that the provisions of Article 290, paragraphs 1 to 4 remain relevant equally for this Tribunal. This

Tribunal is also obliged to equally preserve the respective rights of both parties, as required by Article 290, paragraph 1 of the Convention.

Coming to question 3 put by the Tribunal, asking the parties to comment on paragraphs 134 and 135 of the ITLOS Order, and any implication that the parties believe it may have for the current proceedings, India maintains that if one has to place the decision of the ITLOS in its correct perspective, the fundamental premise of the Order dated 24th August 2015, and paragraphs 134 and 135, points to the need for balanced provisional measures, capable of equally protecting the interests and rights of both the parties. This consideration, in India's view, remains relevant in the context of the question put by the Tribunal.

As regards the question raised by the Tribunal today, which I will read: in light of Italy's request, what commitments on the part of Italy would be acceptable to India?

Mr President, India does not seek anything more onerous than the benchmark set by the Supreme Court of India, and some of these conditions were indicated by Italy's counsel yesterday.

India needs to be assured that in case the Tribunal finds that India has jurisdiction, the

- 1 presence of Sergeant Girone would be ensured. Towards
- that end, India would deem it necessary that the
- 3 Tribunal itself fix these quarantees.
- 4 Before I read my formal submission, I would like
- 5 to thank you, Mr President, and the members of the
- 6 Tribunal for their attention, and giving us a patient
- 7 hearing. I would also thank the Registrar, Dr Dirk
- Pulkowski, and all of the members of the Registry for
- 9 their co-operation and prompt assistance. I thank the
- 10 court reporter for making available the transcripts
- 11 quickly. I would also like to thank Ambassador
- 12 Azzarello, the Agent for Italy, and his team, for
- 13 their co-operation.
- 14 Mr President, I will now read India's submission.
- For the reasons given by India in its Written
- Observations and during the hearings, the Republic of
- 17 India requests the Arbitral Tribunal to reject the
- submissions made by the Italian Republic in its
- 19 Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures,
- and to refuse to prescribe any new provisional measure
- in the present case.
- Thank you, Mr President.
- 23 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Dr Chadha. I understand that
- this was the last statement by India during this
- 25 hearing. Therefore, unless there are further matters
- for discussion, that brings us to the end of the

- 1 hearing. The parties will be provided shortly after the hearing with verbatim transcripts of all sessions. 2 As is customary, the Registry will liaise with the 3 parties to ensure that any corrections may be required 4 can be incorporated. 5 As the Arbitral Tribunal decided in its Rules of 6 7 Procedure, the transcript will then be published on the PCA case repository. 8 On behalf of the Arbitral Tribunal, I would like 9 10 to take this opportunity to express our appreciation for the high quality of the presentations of the 11 representatives of both Italy and India. I would also 12 like to thank the Agents of both parties for their 13 spirit of co-operation in organising the present 14 hearing. 15 The Arbitral Tribunal will now withdraw to 16 17 deliberate, and will communicate its decision to the 18 parties in due course. Thank you, and the hearing is closed. 19
- 21 (The hearing concluded)

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(5.51 pm)